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Tuesday, Oct. 14, 2008
State of Ohio v. Adam David Jones, Case nos. 2007-2310 and 2007-2311
5th District Court of Appeals (Stark County)
State of Ohio v. Billy J. Thompson, II, Case no. 2007-2389
5th District Court of Appeals (Fairfield County)
Frances B. Mandelbaum v. Stanley E. Mandelbaum, Case nos. 2007-2422 and 2008-0375
2nd District Court of Appeals (Montgomery County)
James Minno et al. v. Pro-Fab et al., Case no. 2008-0170
11th District Court of Appeals (Trumbull County)
Is Police Vehicle Search ‘Unreasonable’ if Based on Traffic Stop Outside Officer’s Jurisdiction?
State of Ohio v. Adam David Jones, Case nos. 2007-2310 and 2007-2311
5th District Court of Appeals (Stark County)
ISSUE: Did a vehicle search conducted by police officer in the course of a traffic stop that was made outside of the officer’s geographic jurisdiction violate the vehicle occupants’ Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures?
BACKGROUND: In September 2006, East Canton police officer Mitchell Hershberger was dispatched to the scene of a reported two-vehicle traffic accident in East Canton. When he arrived, both vehicles had left the scene. A witness working at a nearby gas station informed Hershberger that a red Ford Ranger had struck the rear end of a van. The witness reported that the drivers of the vehicles had briefly exchanged words at the scene, and then departed, with the van leaving first. Hershberger found debris from the crash including broken glass in the street, and spent about five minutes removing it from the roadway.
On his way back to the village hall, Hershberger received a radio report regarding a red Ranger with a smashed front end and no headlights “hiding” at a location about a half mile outside of East Canton. Hershberger drove to that location, but did not find the reported vehicle. He then drove approximately 1.5 miles farther away from East Canton, where the occupants of a pickup truck approached his patrol car and informed him that they had just had a near collision with a red Ranger driving without headlights. The officer drove in the direction of the reported near-accident and subsequently spotted and stopped the damaged Ranger for driving without headlights approximately 1.25 miles outside of East Canton. The vehicle was occupied by driver Adam Jones and passenger Shawn Skropits.
In a search of the Ranger pursuant to the traffic stop, Hershberger found four handguns and a sawed-off shotgun, and ammunition for those weapons. Jones and Skropits were subsequently indicted on felony charges of possession of concealed weapons and possession of dangerous ordnance. Prior to trial, both defendants filed motions to suppress the evidence discovered during the vehicle search, arguing that the traffic stop and search were unreasonable because Hershberger had no jurisdiction to stop or search a vehicle outside of East Canton. The trial court overruled the motions to suppress. Both defendants entered no contest pleas and were convicted and sentenced to community control sanctions for two years.
Jones and Skropits both appealed their convictions on the basis that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence obtained through the vehicle search. In a 2-1 decision, the Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and vacated the convictions, holding that Hershberger’s search of the vehicle violated the defendants’ Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The state sought and was granted Supreme Court review of the Fifth District’s ruling.
Attorneys for the Stark County prosecutor’s office argue that the Fifth District’s decision was contrary to the Supreme Court of Ohio’s holding in State v. Weideman (2002). In Weideman, they assert, the Court held that a police officer had reasonable grounds to make a traffic stop outside his geographic area of jurisdiction if the officer has personally witnessed a traffic law or criminal violation. In this case, they say, the officer personally observed Jones driving on a public roadway after dark without headlights, and therefore had authority to stop and search the vehicle outside of his normal area of jurisdiction.
Attorneys for Jones and Skropits respond that the cases cited by the state do not give police officers unlimited authority to make traffic stops or search vehicles outside their jurisdiction, but limit that authority to cases in which the officer is in “hot pursuit” of a subject that he reasonably suspects of committing a traffic or criminal offense within the officer’s jurisdiction. In this case, they assert, the Fifth District correctly held that there was no reasonable basis for Hershberger’s pursuit of the Ranger outside of East Canton from the beginning, because the events surrounding the accident in East Canton as described by the witness did not constitute a criminal offense. They point out that all the law requires is that drivers involved in an accident identify themselves and exchange information, not that they remain at the scene if neither party summoned police. They contend that Hershberger’s receipt of subsequent reports of a vehicle “hiding” in a location outside of East Canton or driving with its lights off outside of East Canton did not give him extra-territorial authority to investigate those complaints or to pursue, stop and search a vehicle outside of his jurisdiction and arrest the occupants.
Contacts
Ronald M. Caldwell, 330.451.7869, for the state and Stark County prosecutor’s office.
Steven A. Reish, 330.451.7209, for Adam Jones.
George Urban, 330.437.0101, for Shawn Skropits.
Must State Show Via Trial Records That Offender’s Prior Waivers of Counsel Were Knowing, Voluntary?
State of Ohio v. Billy J. Thompson, II, Case no. 2007-2389
5th District Court of Appeals (Fairfield County)
ISSUE: When a defendant faces a repeat-offense charge that is enhanced from a misdemeanor to a felony based on prior convictions, and the defendant challenges the constitutionality of his waivers of counsel in the prior cases, does the state’s production of signed waiver-of-counsel forms meet its burden of proof of a knowing and voluntary waiver, or must the state produce evidence from the trial records of the prior cases demonstrating that the judge orally advised the defendant of his right to counsel in open court and determined that the defendant knew and understood that right and waived it voluntarily?
BACKGROUND: Billy Thompson II of Fairfield County was charged with DUI after he was stopped by a State Highway Patrol trooper and a test of his blood revealed an alcohol level of 0.134 percent. Because Thompson has three prior DUI convictions within the preceding six years, he was indicted on a felony count of fourth-offense DUI. Prior to trial, and again at trial, Thompson entered motions to strike one or more of the prior convictions underlying his felony indictment based on a claim that his waivers of the right to an attorney in those cases were invalid because the trial judge had not orally advised him of his right to counsel in open court and determined that he knew and understood that right.
In opposing the motions to strike, the Fairfield County prosecutor’s office produced judgment entries recording his three prior DUI convictions, acknowledgement-and-waiver-of-rights forms from two of those court cases, and records from the third case indicating that Thompson was represented by an attorney. The two waiver of counsel forms were signed by Thompson but not by the trial judge. The prosecutor did not produce transcripts of the court’s in-court dialogues with Thompson regarding his waiver of rights in either of the prior DUI proceedings in which he waived his right to counsel. The trial court denied Thompson’s motions to strike his prior convictions, ruling that the documents produced by the state were sufficient to support a finding that his prior convictions should be applied to enhance his latest DUI offense to a felony. He was convicted on a felony count of fourth-offense DUI and sentenced to two years in prison, with all but the first 60 days of that term stayed on conditions.
Thompson appealed. The Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed the felony conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. In its decision, the court of appeals held that nothing in the documentation of Thompson’s prior DUI convictions produced by the prosecutor provided the trial court with evidence that the judge in those cases had engaged in the required dialogue with him to ensure that he knew and understood his right to an attorney and was waiving that right voluntarily.
Attorneys for the prosecutor’s office now ask the Supreme Court to overrule the Fifth District and reinstate Thompson’s felony conviction. They argue that the court of appeals’ ruling was contrary to the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in State v. Brooke, in which this Court held that, where a transcript of the judge’s colloquy with a defendant from a prior conviction was not available, a copy of the notification-and-waiver-of-rights form signed by the defendant at trial was sufficient to support a finding that she had knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to an attorney in that case. They also assert that in enforcing “look-back” laws like the repeat-offender DUI statute, the state is sometimes unable to obtain a complete record of a defendant’s prior court case. If a signed waiver-of-rights form from a prior case is not presumptive proof of a valid waiver of counsel, they argue, it will be impossible for the state in many cases to pursue the clear intent of the legislature that repeat DUI offenders be subject to felony-level penalties for a fourth or subsequent offense.
Attorneys for Thompson respond that the waiver-of-rights form found sufficient in the Brooke case was signed not only by the defendant but also by the trial judge, and included a specific statement attested to by the judge that “Defendant was asked if he understood all of these things, and satisfied this court that he did and that he wishes to waive his right to counsel.” They also note that the prosecutor in Brooke provided the trial court with an affidavit signed by the clerk of the court in which the defendant’s prior offense was tried attesting that the transcript of her hearing in that case was unavailable because it had been disposed of in keeping with that court’s records retention policy.
In contrast to Brooke, they assert, the trial court in this case did not make a specific finding that there had been a proper discussion between the judge and Thompson in his earlier cases establishing his knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel. They also note that the prosecutor in Thompson’s current case provided no affidavit that the transcripts of his prior court hearings was unavailable, and the waiver-of-rights form upheld by the trial judge in this case was signed only by the defendant, and did not include any affirmation by the judge in the prior case that he had engaged in a colloquy with Thompson to determine that he understood and was voluntarily waiving his right to counsel.
Contacts
Julia B. Dillon, 614.837.2699, for the state and Fairfield County prosecutor’s office.
Andrew T. Sanderson, 740.345.0417, for Billy Thompson II.
Must Court Find ‘Substantial’ or ‘Unexpected’ Change in Circumstances to Modify Spousal Support?
Frances B. Mandelbaum v. Stanley E. Mandelbaum, Case nos. 2007-2422 and 2008-0375
2nd District Court of Appeals (Montgomery County)
ISSUE: Does a provision of state law authorizing trial courts to modify the amount of a spousal support order only when there has been a “change in circumstances” of either party limit the court’s jurisdiction to cases in which there has been a substantial or drastic change in the income or expenses of a party, or in which the cited change in circumstances was not contemplated at the time the original decree was entered?
BACKGROUND: In this case, the Supreme Court is asked to resolve a conflict among Ohio’s courts of appeals over the proper interpretation of R.C. 3105.18(F), which defines the kinds of “changes in circumstances” that confer jurisdiction on a trial court to consider a petition for adjustment of an existing spousal support order.
Stanley and Frances Mandelbaum of Montgomery County were divorced in 2000. In its final decree, the trial court ordered Stanley to pay Frances $1,500 per month in spousal support. It also included provisions agreed to by the couple continuing the jurisdiction of the trial court over the spousal support agreement, giving each party a right to seek an adjustment of the amount of support based on a change in the financial circumstances of either party, and indicating that it was both parties’ intention that their combined income continue to be allocated equally between them.
In 2005, Stanley filed a petition in the trial court seeking a reduction in his monthly spousal support obligation based on changes in his financial obligations resulting from his remarriage. A magistrate issued an opinion finding that the net change in Stanley’s income and expenses since the original decree did not justify a reduction and recommending that the court continue his current support obligation. Stanley filed objections to the magistrate’s findings, and Frances filed a reply to those objections, asking the court to affirm the magistrate’s recommendation. The trial court found that the magistrate had based his calculations on an excessive calculation of Stanley’s current income, and adjusted his monthly support obligation to $925.
Frances appealed the trial court’s action to the Second District Court of Appeals. That court did not rule directly on Frances’ assignments of error, but instead held that the trial court had abused its discretion in agreeing to review Stanley’s petition for adjustment of the original spousal support award without making a preliminary finding that there had been a “substantial” change in the parties’ circumstances that was “not contemplated” at the time of the original decree. The Second District subsequently certified that its interpretation of the law was in conflict with rulings in other Ohio appellate districts. The Supreme Court agreed to review the case to resolve the conflict among appellate districts.
Attorneys for Stanley assert that the plain language of R.C. 3105.18(F) defines a “change in circumstances” sufficient to authorize a review of an existing spousal support order as “... any increase or involuntary decrease in the party’s wages, salary, bonuses, living expenses or medical expenses.” They argue that there is no language in the statute to support the Second District’s holding that a trial court must find that a change in a party’s income or expenses is “substantial” or “drastic,” or that the cited change was “not contemplated” at the time of the initial decree, before it may consider a party’s petition to adjust spousal support.
They note that the appellate districts applying the requirement that a change in circumstances must be “substantial” or “significant” do so by referring to a former version of the spousal support statute that was modified by the legislature in 1986 and again in 1991, and to past court decisions applying that outdated standard. They urge the Court to apply the long-established principle that when the plain language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts applying that law must follow the statutory language and may not “interpret” the statute in a way that adds or subtracts conditions that were not enacted by the General Assembly. In this case, they assert, Stanley’s petition clearly set forth changes in his income and expenses, and under the plain language of current R.C. 3105.18(F) the trial court therefore had jurisdiction to review and rule on that petition.
Counsel for Frances filed a letter with the Court stating that she chose not to enter a responsive brief. Under the Supreme Court’s rules of practice and procedure, a party that fails to file a brief within the allotted time period waives participation in oral argument. Accordingly, the Court will hear argument in this case only from counsel for Stanley.
Contacts
Mark E. Stone, 937.427.9650, for Stanley Mandelbaum.
Charles D. Lowe, 937.222.8091, for Frances Mandelbaum.
Must Company Have Ownership Interest in Sister Company to Be Liable for Damages as ‘Alter Ego?’
James Minno et al. v. Pro-Fab et al., Case no. 2008-0170
11th District Court of Appeals (Trumbull County)
ISSUE: Under Ohio law, can one corporation exert the necessary control over a “sister” corporation to be held civilly liable for negligent acts or omissions by the sister company if the first company does not hold any ownership interest in the second?
BACKGROUND: James Minno of Trumbull County was rendered paraplegic by injuries he suffered in a work-related fall in the course of his employment by See-Ann Inc. Minno filed a civil lawsuit seeking damages for alleged negligence by his employer in failing to provide him with fall-protection safety line. In an amended complaint, Minno asserted intentional tort damage claims not only against See-Ann, but also against Pro-Fab Inc., a separate company wholly owned by the same two shareholders who owned See-Ann.
Pro-Fab filed a summary judgment motion seeking dismissal of all Minno’s claims against it, arguing that Minno was employed by and under the sole control of See-Ann at the time he was injured, and had no legal claim against Pro-Fab, which was a separate corporate entity with no ownership interest in or operational control over See-Ann. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Pro-Fab.
On review, the 11th District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded Minno’s claims against Pro-Fab for further proceedings. In a 2-1 majority decision, the court of appeals held that Minno had provided the trial court with sufficient documentation regarding the close relationship between the two corporate entities to raise a material question of fact regarding whether See-Ann was actually an “alter ego” so intertwined with and controlled by Pro-Fab that the two companies were effectively a single business.
Attorneys for Pro-Fab now ask the Supreme Court to overrule the 11th District and reinstate the summary judgment dismissing all of Minno’s claims against the company. They argue that the court of appeals erred in its legal reasoning by applying a three-part test for “piercing the veil” of a corporation (ignoring the corporate entity and imposing direct liability on individual owners) set forth in the Supreme Court of Ohio’s 1993 decision in Belvedere Condominium Unit Owners Assn. v. R.E. Roark. They contend that Belvedere only applies to cases in which a plaintiff is attempting to go behind a corporate entity and collect damages from an owner of a business. They point out that in this case it is undisputed that the business entity that is Pro-Fab holds no ownership interest in See-Ann, and therefore, even if Minno established legal grounds to “pierce the veil” of See-Ann, he still could not collect damages from Pro-Fab for any negligent acts or omissions by See-Ann that resulted in his injuries.
Attorneys for Minno urge the Court to affirm the 11th District’s ruling that the Belvedere test allows a plaintiff to go behind a corporate entity and impose liability not only on the individual or corporate owners of that entity, but also on a separate “alter ego” business entity that is controlled by the same shareholders if the plaintiff can show that the alter ego entity effectively controls the actions and business decisions of the company that caused injury. In this case, they argue, Minno met the threshold test to defeat a motion for summary judgment by providing the trial court with evidence that Pro-Fab and See-Ann were engaged in the same business, were owned by the same individuals, operated out of the same corporate offices, shared phone lines, utilized shared safety training and standards, shared the use of the same tools and worksite equipment and shared employees including the worksite foreman who failed to provide Minno with required safety equipment on the day he was injured.
Contacts
Craig G. Pelini, 330.305.6400, for Pro-Fab Inc..
James R. Scher, 330.393.3200, for James Minno.
These informal previews are prepared by the Supreme Court's Office of Public Information to provide the news media and other interested persons with a brief overview of the legal issues and arguments advanced by the parties in upcoming cases scheduled for oral argument. The previews are not part of the case record, and are not considered by the Court during its deliberations.
Parties interested in receiving additional information are encouraged to review the case file available in the Supreme Court Clerk's Office (614.387.9530), or to contact counsel of record.