Officer Who Personally Observes Traffic Violation Has Probable Cause for Stop Outside His Jurisdiction
2007-2310 and 2007-2311. State v. Jones, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-316.
Stark App. No. 2007-CA-00139, 2007-Ohio-5818, and Stark App. No. 2007-CA-00098, 2007-Ohio-5817. Judgments of the court of appeals reversed, and judgments of the trial court reinstated.
Moyer, C.J., and Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Pfeifer and O'Donnell, JJ., concur separately.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-Ohio-316.pdf 
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(Feb. 4, 2009) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that a law enforcement officer who personally observes a traffic violation while outside the officer’s territorial jurisdiction has probable cause to make a traffic stop, and the stop is therefore not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Court’s lead opinion was written by Justice Maureen O’Connor.
On the night of Sept. 27, 2006, East Canton police officer Mitchell Hershberger responded to a reported traffic accident in East Canton. When he arrived at the scene, both vehicles had left. A witness informed Hershberger that a red Ford Ranger had struck the rear end of a van. The witness reported that the drivers of the vehicles had briefly exchanged words at the scene and then departed, with the Ford heading west. Hershberger noticed some debris from the Ford left in the street.
Approximately 10 minutes later, Hershberger received a radio report regarding a red Ford Ranger with a smashed front end and no headlights “hiding” at a location about a half mile outside of East Canton. Hershberger drove to that location, but did not find the reported vehicle. He drove approximately another half-mile away from East Canton, then turned around and headed back, checking various businesses for the damaged Ford. While he was checking a car wash, the occupants of a pickup truck approached his patrol car and reported that they had just had a near collision with a red Ranger driving without headlights. While still outside of East Canton, Hershberger saw the damaged Ranger driving without headlights and stopped it. The vehicle was occupied by driver Adam Jones and passenger Shawn Skropits.
After the vehicle was pulled over, Hershberger asked the occupants if they had any weapons in the car. Jones and Skropits admitted that they did have weapons. In addition, Jones told Hershberger that he did not have a driver license, which was why he had left the accident scene. Hershberger arrested Jones and Skropits and charged each with one count of carrying a concealed weapon and one count of unlawful possession of dangerous ordnance. They were subsequently indicted on those charges. Prior to trial, both defendants filed motions to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop, arguing that the stop and subsequent search of the vehicle were unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional because the stop violated R.C. 2935.03, which governs the territorial jurisdiction in which a police officer may make an arrest. The trial court overruled the motions to suppress. Both defendants then entered no contest pleas and were convicted and sentenced to community control sanctions.
Jones and Skropits appealed their convictions on the basis that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence obtained through the vehicle search. In a 2-1 decision, the 5th District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and vacated the convictions, holding that Hershberger’s stop and search of the vehicle outside of his territorial jurisdiction in violation of R.C. 2935.03 violated the defendants’ Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The state sought and was granted Supreme Court review of the 5th District’s ruling.
In today’s decision, which reversed the 5th District and reinstated Jones’ and Skropits’ convictions, the Court held that, when read in combination with each other, the Supreme Court of Ohio’s 2002 decision in State v. Weideman and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2008 holding in Virginia v. Moore “are dispositive of this matter.”
Justice O’Connor wrote: “We held in Weideman that ‘[w]here a law enforcement officer, acting outside the officer’s statutory territorial jurisdiction, stops and detains a motorist for an offense committed and observed outside the officer’s jurisdiction, the seizure of the motorist by the officer is not unreasonable per se under the Fourth Amendment.’ … But by stating that the stop was not per se unreasonable, it follows that a court could find that an extraterritorial stop is unreasonable based on the unique facts and circumstances of a particular case. The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Moore, however, removed any room for finding that a violation of a state statute, such as R.C. 2935.03, in and of itself, could give rise to a Fourth Amendment violation and result in the suppression of evidence. Officers stopped and arrested Moore for driving on a suspended license. … Under Virginia law, the officers should have issued Moore a summons rather than arresting him because driving on a suspended license was generally not an arrestable offense. Following Moore’s arrest, the officers found 16 grams of crack cocaine and $516 on his person.”
“Moore moved to suppress the evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. … The trial court denied the motion, but the Supreme Court of Virginia ultimately reversed the ruling. … The United States Supreme Court then reversed that judgment, thus reinstating the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress. … The Moore court explained that ‘when an officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime in his presence, the balancing of private and public interests is not in doubt. The arrest is constitutionally reasonable.’”
Applying that legal rationale to the current case, Justice O’Connor wrote that because Officer Hershberger personally observed Jones driving at night without lights in violation of state law, Hershberger had probable cause to stop the vehicle; and the stop was constitutionally valid despite Hershberger’s violation of the jurisdiction statute “because the violation of R.C. 2935.03 does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation for the reasons expressed in Moore.”
Justice O’Connor’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer and Justices Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Judith Ann Lanzinger and Robert R. Cupp.
Justice Terrence O’Donnell entered a separate opinion, joined by Justice Paul E. Pfeifer, in which he concurred with the majority’s judgment, but set forth a separate three-part legal analysis as the basis for overturning the 5th District and reinstating Jones’ and Skropits’ convictions.
Contacts
Ronald M. Caldwell, 330.451.7869, for the state and Stark County prosecutor’s office.
Steven A. Reish, 330.451.7209, for Adam Jones.