Court Upholds 10-Day Time Limit for Appealing County Revocation of Home Child Care Provider’s License
2008-0462. Crawford-Cole v. Lucas Cty. Dept. of Job & Family Servs., Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-1355.
Lucas App. No. L-07-1188, 174 Ohio App.3d 617, 2008-Ohio-359. Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Moyer, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-Ohio-1355.pdf 
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(March 31, 2009) In a 7-0 decision announced today, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that R.C. 119.07, which sets a 30-day time limit for requesting a hearing on an agency determination, applies only to actions of state agencies, while Section 5101:2-14-40 of the Ohio Administrative Code, which provides a 10-day period for appealing a county’s action concerning certification of a home child care provider, applies to county agencies.
The Court’s decision, which reversed a ruling 6th District Court of Appeals, was authored by Justice Terrence O’Donnell.
Patricia Crawford-Cole of Toledo was licensed by the Lucas County Department of Job and Family Services (LCDJFS) as a provider of Type B (in-home) child care services and contracted with LCDJFS to provide publicly funded child care for up to six children in her home. On July 20, 2006, LCDJFS made an unscheduled inspection visit to Crawford-Cole’s home. The inspectors found 10 violations of state day-care regulations.
On July 24, 2006, the department sent a registered letter to Crawford-Cole’s home notifying her that it had decided to revoke her child care provider license as of Aug. 3, 2006, based on the rule violations for which she was cited in the July 20 inspection. The letter advised Crawford-Cole that under the applicable provision of the Ohio Administrative Code she had 10 days from the date of the notice to request an administrative hearing on her license revocation with LCDJFS. A person other than Crawford-Cole signed a receipt acknowledging delivery of the revocation notice. No request for a hearing was received within the 10-day deadline.
On Aug. 10, 2006, 17 days after the revocation notice was delivered, Crawford-Cole sent a letter to LCDJFS stating that she had not received the revocation letter until Aug. 9 and that she wished to initiate an appeal of the revocation. She also called the agency, which advised her that she had missed the deadline and that her request for a hearing would not be granted.
Crawford-Cole subsequently filed an appeal of her license revocation in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas. LCDJFS filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that because Crawford-Cole had failed to exhaust her available remedies by pursuing an administrative appeal within the 10-day deadline, the common pleas court did not have jurisdiction to hear a subsequent appeal of the department’s action. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Crawford-Cole appealed. On review, the 6th District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the common pleas court with a directive that it hear and decide Crawford-Cole’s appeal of her license revocation. The appellate panel agreed with Crawford-Cole’s argument that the Administrative Code provision setting a 10-day time limit for requesting a hearing was invalid because it was in conflict with a provision of state law, R.C. 119.07, that sets forth a 30-day time limit for appealing a decision by an agency.
LCDJFS sought and was granted Supreme Court review of the 6th District’s ruling.
In today’s decision reversing the 6th District, Justice O’Donnell wrote: “The appellate court ... overlooked two important aspects of these statutes. First, R.C. Chapter 119 focuses on two distinct sets of procedures: one, the procedures governing administrative rulemaking, and two, the procedures governing administrative decisions by agencies. The first part of the Chapter, R.C. 119.02 to 119.04, deals with rulemaking and requires agencies to give public notice of proposed rules ... It is the second part of the Chapter, R.C. 119.06 to 119.13, that concerns agency adjudications and the procedures for notice, hearing, and appeal of those decisions.”
“Here, the mandate in R.C. 5104.011(G) for the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services to ‘adopt rules pursuant to Chapter 119 of the Revised Code governing the certification of type B family day-care homes’ clearly refers to the part of Chapter 119 that concerns the rulemaking process, not to the part that concerns notice, hearing, and appeal of decisions by an agency. ... In contrast to R.C. 5104.011(F)(9), R.C. 5104.011(G)(2)(g), the section at issue in this case, requires the rules to include ‘[p]rocedures for issuing, renewing, denying, refusing to renew, or revoking certificates’ without any reference to R.C. Chapter 119. Reading these statutes in pari materia (together) we conclude that the General Assembly’s reference to Chapter 119 in R.C. 5104.011(G)(2) relates to the statutes governing agency rulemaking, R.C. 119.02 to 119.04, not to the statutes governing agency decisionmaking, R.C. 119.06 to 119.13.”
As further evidence of this legislative intent, Justice O’Donnell cited language in R.C. 5101.09(B) which states: “‘Except as otherwise required by the Revised Code, the adoption of a rule in accordance with Chapter 119 of the Revised Code does not make the department of job and family services, a county family services agency, or a workforce development agency subject to the notice, hearing, or other requirements of sections 119.06 to 119.13 of the Revised Code.’ ... Thus, the 30-day period set forth in R.C. 119.07 does not apply to the county’s decision to revoke Crawford-Cole’s type B certificate and does not conflict with the 10-day period set forth in Ohio Admin. Code 5101:2-14-40.”
Justice O’Donnell wrote that the court of appeals’ second error was in applying Chapter 119 of the Revised Code to a county-level agency. He noted that the definition of “agency” set forth in R.C. 119.01(A)(1) includes an extensive list of governmental entities, all of which “are arms ‘of the government of the state,’ and the words ‘county,’ ‘municipality,’ or ‘political subdivision’ do not appeal anywhere in the statute. Furthermore, we reviewed R.C. 119.01(A)(1) in Karrick v. Findlay School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1963) ... and stated that “[a] careful reading of the above-quoted statutory language [in R.C. 119.01(A)] clearly indicates that only agencies at the state level of government are covered by [R.C. Chapter 119]. (Emphasis added.)”
Citing several instances in which the language adopted by the General Assembly has made it clear that it intended provisions of a statute to apply to both state agencies and counties, Justice O’Donnell concluded that the absence of any such language in R.C. Chapter 119 indicates legislative intent that the statute apply only to agencies at the state level. “Based on the foregoing,” he wrote, “we conclude that the 30-day period set forth by R.C. 119.07 does not apply to a request for a hearing on the decision of a county agency or conflict with the 10-day period set forth in Ohio Admin. Code 5101:2-14-40. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.”
Contacts
John A. Borell, 419.213.2001, for the Lucas County Dept. of Job & Family Services.
Terry Lodge, 419.255.7552, for Patricia Crawford-Cole.