Age Bias Lawsuit Barred If Arbitration Found Employee’s Dismissal to be For Just Cause
2008-0315. Meyer v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-2463.
Hamilton App. No. C-060772, 174 Ohio App.3d 339, 2007-Ohio-7063. Judgment reversed, and cause remanded to the trial court.
Moyer, C.J., and Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Pfeifer, J., dissents.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-Ohio-2463.pdf 
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(June 2, 2009) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that lawsuits asserting an age discrimination claim under R.C. 4112.99 are subject to the substantive conditions and requirements for bringing age discrimination claims set forth in R.C. 4112.02 and 4112.14.
Applying that holding to a Hamilton County case, the Court ruled that an age discrimination claim brought against United Parcel Service (UPS) by a former employee, Robert Meyer, was barred by R.C. 4112.14(C), which provides that when the discharge of an employee has been arbitrated and the discharge has been found to be for just cause, the worker may not sue the employer for wrongful termination based on age discrimination.
The Court’s 6-1 decision was authored by Justice Robert R. Cupp.
After a union/management grievance panel rejected Meyer’s claim that he had been discharged without just cause, Meyer filed suit against UPS in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas in May 2004. He initially asserted a wrongful discharge claim based only on R.C. 4123.90, which prohibits the firing of a worker in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim. In July 2005, Meyer amended his complaint to also assert a claim of age discrimination under R.C. 4112.99, a general provision of Ohio’s civil rights statute that provides that a party engaging in any type of discriminatory conduct prohibited by Chapter 4112 “is subject to an action for civil damages, injunctive relief, or any other appropriate relief.”
Both claims were tried to a jury, which found in favor of Meyer on both causes of action and awarded him $113,000 in back pay, $175,000 in other compensatory damages, $25,000 in punitive damages and additional amounts for prejudgment interest, attorney fees and court costs. UPS appealed. On review, the 1st District Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s judgments and damage awards on both causes of action based on its findings that: 1) Meyer’s workers’ compensation-based complaint should not have been tried to a jury; and 2) the jury’s verdict and award based on his separate age discrimination claim were influenced by the evidence he presented in support of his workers’ compensation claim, and therefore the award on that claim must also be vacated and retried.
In its opinion, the court of appeals rejected arguments by UPS that Meyer’s age discrimination complaint under R.C. 4112.99 should have been barred by language in R.C. 4112.14(C) that precludes litigation of an age discrimination claim if the plaintiff’s discharge has previously been arbitrated and found to have been for just cause. UPS sought Supreme Court review of the 1st District’s judgment. The Justices agreed to review only the portion of the court of appeals decision holding that R.C. 4112.14(C) was not applicable to Meyer’s age discrimination claim.
Writing for the majority in today’s decision, Justice Cupp reviewed the language of several provisions in R.C. Chapter 4112 that set specific conditions for the filing of age discrimination complaints, as distinct from other types of civil rights actions, and then reviewed a line of decisions in which the Supreme Court of Ohio has previously applied and interpreted those provisions to different factual situations.
Citing this Court’s holdings in Elek v. Huntington Natl. Bank (1991); Bellian v. Bicron Corp. (1994); and Cosgrove v. Williamsburg of Cincinnati Mgt. Co. (1994), and particularly a separate concurring opinion in Cosgrove written by former Justice Alice Robie Resnick that was joined by a majority of justices, Justice Cupp wrote: “The concurring opinion in Cosgrove observed that ‘R.C. 4112.99 functions as a gap-filling provision, establishing civil liability for violations of rights for which no other provision for civil liability has been made.’ ... Because age-discrimination claims are specifically addressed in R.C. Chapter 4112, it necessarily follows from Elek, Bellian, and Cosgrove that age-discrimination claims are not governed by the general gap-filling provisions of R.C. 4112.99. Rather, they are covered by the statutes in R.C. Chapter 4112 that are specific to age discrimination.”
Finding that the reasoning of the Cosgrove concurrence remains sound, Justice Cupp wrote: “R.C. 4112.99 continues to function as a gap-filler. Even if an age-discrimination claim is filed solely pursuant to R.C. 4112.99, that statute does not govern the specifics of the claim because there is no gap to fill for such a claim. ... To allow the general provisions of R.C. 4112.99 to prevail over the specific provisions of R.C. 4112.02(N) and 4112.14 would ignore the relevant statutes and would turn the framework of R.C. Chapter 4112 relating to age-discrimination claims on its head. That R.C. 4112.08 requires a liberal construction of R.C. Chapter 4112 does not allow courts to ignore clear statutory directives. Consistently with the statutory framework for age-discrimination claims set forth within R.C. Chapter 4112, and with our precedents interpreting that framework, we hold that an age-discrimination claim brought pursuant to R.C. 4112.99 is subject to the substantive provisions of R.C. 4112.02 and 4112.14.”
Based on that analysis, and finding that the UPS grievance process in Meyer’s case was “the functional equivalent of arbitration,” Justice Cupp concluded: “Our holding ... that an age-discrimination claim brought pursuant to R.C. 4112.99 is subject to the substantive provisions of R.C. 4112.02 and 4112.14 establishes that R.C. 4112.14(C) must apply to Meyer’s age-discrimination claim. ... We hold that pursuant to R.C. 4112.14(C), when the discharge of an employee has been arbitrated and the discharge has been found to be for just cause, the discharged employee is barred from pursuing an action for age discrimination. We conclude that R.C. 4112.14(C) applies to bar Meyer’s age-discrimination claim, because his discharge was arbitrated and was found to be for just cause. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals on the dispositive issue.”
Noting that today’s ruling has no bearing on Meyer’s separate claim of wrongful termination in retaliation for his filing of workers’ compensation claims, the Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings on that claim.
Justice Cupp’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer and Justices Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Maureen O’Connor, Terrence O’Donnell and Judith Ann Lanzinger.
Justice Paul E. Pfeifer dissented, writing that because nothing in the actual language of R.C. 4112.99 indicates legislative intent that that section functioned as a “gap-filler,” “I see no reason for this court to depart from common rules of statutory interpretation and add those words to the statute.”
Justice Pfeifer went on to state: “In concluding that R.C. 4112.99 is subject to R.C. 4112.14(C), the majority opinion violates another common rule of statutory interpretation by ignoring the plain meaning of R.C. 4112.14(C). R.C. 4112.14(C) states that it applies to causes of action ‘described in division (B) of this section and any remedies available pursuant to sections 4112.01 to 4112.11 of the Revised Code.’ According to its own plain language, R.C. 4112.14(C) does not apply to RC. 4112.99. ...Furthermore, R.C. 4112.08 states that ‘This chapter [R.C. 4112] shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of its purposes[.]’ It is impossible to reconcile the result the majority opinion reaches and the means it uses to reach that result with the General Assembly’s mandate that R.C. 4112.99 be liberally construed ‘to protect victims of discrimination.’”
Contacts
Kasey L. Bond: 513.651.5800, for United Parcel Service, Inc.
Stacy A. Hinners, 513.621.8800, for Robert Meyer.