Supreme Court Upholds $250,000 Cap on Non-Economic Damage Awards Against Cities
2008-1463. Oliver v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co. Ltd. Partnership, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5030.
Cuyahoga App. Nos. 89314, 89428, and 89463, 176 Ohio App.3d 410, 2008-Ohio-2183. Judgment of the court of appeals reversed, and cause remanded to the trial court.
Moyer, C.J., and Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Pfeifer, J., dissents with opinion.
O’Donnell, J., dissents for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-Ohio-5030.pdf 
View oral argument video of this case.
(Oct. 1, 2009) The Supreme Court of Ohio today upheld as constitutional a state law that places a $250,000 cap on the amount of noneconomic damages that an injured party may recover from a city or other political subdivision of the state in a civil lawsuit. The Court’s 5-2 majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer, reversed a decision of the 8th District Court of Appeals.
R.C. 2744.05(C)(1), a provision of Ohio’s “sovereign immunity” statute adopted as part of tort reform legislation, provides that except in wrongful death cases, a plaintiff in a civil lawsuit may not recover more than $250,000 in noneconomic damages from a city or other political subdivision of the state, even if a jury should award damages in excess of that amount.
In this case, Donald Krieger and Clifton Oliver of Cleveland were part of a group of persons attending a Cleveland Indians baseball game at Jacobs Field on June 11, 2002. Near the conclusion of the game, an explosive device was dropped from the upper deck and detonated at ground level, injuring four persons. Krieger and Oliver were placed under arrest in connection with the incident and held in jail for four days. During that time they suffered from poor conditions in the jail and harsh treatment by corrections officers.
Krieger and Oliver were each charged with three counts of aggravated arson and felonious assault. All charges were later dismissed by the prosecutor’s office. As a result of their arrest and detention, both men’s jobs and mental and physical health were adversely affected.
Krieger and Oliver successfully sued the city of Cleveland for malicious prosecution, false arrest and imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The jury awarded each plaintiff $400,000 in compensatory damages and $600,000 in punitive damages. The trial court vacated the punitive-damages award as impermissible against the city. The trial court overruled the city’s motion, to reduce the compensatory-damages award to $250,000 for each plaintiff pursuant to the cap imposed by R.C. 2744.05(C)(1). The city appealed the trial court’s judgment regarding the applicability of the statutory $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages. The 8th District Court of Appeals affirmed the awards of $400,000 to each plaintiff, holding that R.C. 2744.05(C)(1) is unconstitutional because it violates a plaintiff’s right to a jury trial and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The city sought and was granted Supreme Court review of the 8th District’s decision.
In today’s majority opinion reversing the 8th District, Chief Justice Moyer observed that in Arbino v. Johnson (2007), the Supreme Court reviewed and affirmed the constitutionality of statutory caps on noneconomic damages in lawsuits between private parties, and said the same legal analysis is applicable in this case.
“In Arbino, we reviewed a statute similar to R.C. 2744.05(C)(1), but in a different chapter of the Revised Code, R.C. 2315.18. ... Although the statute at issue differs from the statute in Arbino in that R.C. 2744.05 applies to damage awards against political subdivisions, not private litigants, the purpose and effect of the statute in Arbino and the statute in this case are the same – to limit compensatory-damage awards for noneconomic harm,” wrote Chief Justice Moyer.
“In Arbino, we considered the effect of the damage caps on the right to a jury trial. We founded our analysis on the principle that the fact-finding of a jury is inviolate for those causes for which the right is preserved. ... The right ensures that a jury’s fact-finding function is not invaded, ignored, or replaced. ... But we noted that ‘the right to a trial by jury does not extend to the determination of questions of law.’ ... Therefore, we reasoned that while a jury determines the amount of damages as a matter of fact, the actual award may be reduced by the application of a statute as a matter of law, akin to altering awards through remittiturs or statutory treble damages. ... Thus, in Arbino, we held that the statutory limit on noneconomic damages in R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) is applied as a matter of law and does not intrude upon the fact-finding function of the jury. ... This proposition is true for R.C. 2744.05(C)(1) just as it was for the statute in Arbino. A court does not intrude into the jury’s fact-finding when applying R.C. 2744.05; instead, the court applies the limit as a matter of law to the facts found by the jury. Therefore, the limit on noneconomic damages in R.C. 2744.05(C)(1) does not unconstitutionally restrict the right to a jury trial under Section 5, Article I of the Ohio Constitution or the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.”
Similarly, Chief Justice Moyer wrote, the equal protection issue raised by Oliver in this case is overcome by the same legal analysis applied in Arbino. “As in Arbino, there is no fundamental right or protected class at issue here, and R.C. 2744.05(C)(1) is facially neutral. ... Therefore, we review the statute to determine whether it has a rational basis. ... R.C. 2744.05(C)(1) will pass constitutional muster under the Ohio and United States Constitutions if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. ... We have upheld a different subsection of R.C. 2744.05 under the rational-basis standard in the equal protection context. Menefee v. Queen City Metro (1990) ... We held that the ‘state has a valid interest in preserving the financial soundness of its political subdivisions.’ ... That same state interest supports R.C. 2744.05(C). A limit on the damages for which a political subdivision may be liable is rationally related to the purpose of preserving the financial integrity of political subdivisions. Therefore, R.C. 2744.05(C)(1) is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.”
The majority opinion was joined by Justices Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Maureen O’Connor, Judith Ann Lanzinger and Robert R. Cupp. Justice Terence O’Donnell dissented, citing the legal reasoning of his earlier dissent in Arbino.
Justice Paul E. Pfeifer entered a dissenting opinion citing his own dissent in Arbino,and reiterated his objections to the similar legal analysis employed in today’s decision.
He wrote: “Instead of jealously safeguarding the right to trial by jury, the majority opinion in this case eviscerates it by holding constitutional a statute that enables courts to ‘enter judgments in disregard of the jury’s verdict.’ Sorrell v. Thevenir (1994) ... Instead of jealously safeguarding the right to trial by jury, the majority opinion concludes that juries can meaningfully determine only facts that do not conflict with predetermined assessments of the General Assembly.”
“Once again, a majority of this court concludes that a statute may amend an inviolate constitutional right, even though we have previously stated that ‘[t]he right of trial by jury, being guaranteed to all our citizens by the Constitution of the state, cannot be invaded or violated by either legislative act or judicial order or decree.’ Gibbs v. Girard (1913). ... Once again, a majority of this court illogically suggests that because ‘the treble-damages provisions of R.C. 901.51, 1331.08, 1345.09, 2307.61, 2923.34(E), and 4905.61, which increase a jury award, have never been held to infringe the right to a trial by jury, then [decreasing] a jury award, “cannot logically violate that right.”’ ... And once again, I state that ‘a statute that authorizes a judge to ignore or change factual findings deprives litigants “of the benefits of Trial by Jury” and must be declared unconstitutional.’ ... R.C. 2744.05(C)(1) unconstitutionally invades the province of the jury by replacing a damages award determined by a jury with a predetermined cap imposed by the General Assembly. I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals on this issue.”
Contacts
Jerome A. Payne, 216.664.2800, for the City of Cleveland.
James W. Burke Jr., 440.777.6500, for Clifton Oliver.
Please note: Opinion summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information for the general public and news media. Opinion summaries are not prepared for every opinion released by the Court, but only for those cases considered noteworthy or of great public interest. Opinion summaries are not to be considered as official headnotes or syllabi of Court opinions. The full text of this and other Court opinions from 1992 to the present are available online from the Reporter of Decisions. In the Full Text search box, enter the eight-digit case number at the top of this summary and click "Submit."
Requires the free Adobe Flash Player.View system requirements, download instructions, and download the free Adobe Flash Player.