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Case CaptionCase No.Topics and IssuesAuthorCitation / CountyDecidedPostedWebCite
State v. Bumu C-160492APPELLATE REVIEW/CRIMINAL: The common pleas court did not abuse its discretion in overruling defendant's R.C. 2943.031(D) motion to withdraw his guilty plea to drug possession on the ground that the trial court had not substantially complied with R.C. 2943.031(A) in advising him of the immigration consequences of his conviction: defendant bore the burden of proving that, under the totality of the circumstances surrounding the entry and acceptance of his plea, he had not subjectively understood his conviction's immigration consequences and that he would not have pled if he had; the common pleas court determined that defendant had failed to sustain that burden; and that determination, in the absence from the record on appeal of a plea-hearing transcript conforming to the requirements of App.R. 9(B), cannot be said to have been arbitrary, unconscionable, or the product of an unsound reasoning process. [But see DISSENT: Bumu complied with App.R. 9(B) and 10(A); therefore this case should be decided on the merits: the record shows that the plea-hearing transcript was made a part of the record in the trial court and in the appellate court under App.R. 10(A); Bumu requested that a complete transcript of the proceedings be filed; the clerk of the trial court did not transmit a bound copy of the plea-hearing transcript, as requested by Bumu; and Bumu made reasonable arrangements for the transcription of the plea hearing; therefore, the omission should be corrected and a supplemental record filed and transmitted as authorized by App.R. 9(E).]MillerHamilton 7/21/2017 7/21/2017 2017-Ohio-6901
Hayes v. Carrigan C-160554, C-160630, C-160641EVIDENCE/WITNESS/TRIAL - TRESPASS: The trial court erred in finding in favor of two neighboring landowners on their respective trespass claims: the plaintiff did not offer any evidence of substantial, noneconomic loss resulting from the defendant's alleged conduct of indirectly trespassing onto the plaintiff's property by way of spraying weed killer, which damaged the plaintiff's bamboo; and the defendant presented insufficient evidence that the plaintiff had acted intentionally with regard to planting bamboo on the property line, which had then spread onto the defendant's property.DetersHamilton 7/19/2017 7/19/2017 2017-Ohio-5867
State v. Stephens C-160653, C-160654DANGEROUS DOGS - SENTENCING: The trial court erred in designating defendant's two dogs as dangerous dogs under R.C. 955.222 as part of defendant's sentences for failing to register the dogs: assuming that the trial court was entitled to enforce R.C. 955.222, the court failed to follow R.C. 955.222's procedure in designating the dogs dangerous and failed to give the defendant notice that he could challenge the designations at a hearing.DetersHamilton 7/19/2017 7/19/2017 2017-Ohio-5868
In re A.T. C-160597 C-160598, C-160599APPELLATE REVIEW - JURISDICTION - FINAL ORDER - JUV.R. 40: Juv.R. 40 contains language identical to Civ.R. 53, and therefore, the requirements outlined in Alexander v. LJF Mgt., Inc., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-090091, 2010-Ohio-2763,  12, are applicable to juvenile court entries regarding magistrate's decisions: the entries are not final until the juvenile court reviews the magistrate's decision and (1) rules on any objections, (2) adopts, modifies or rejects the decision, and (3) enters a judgment that determines all the claims for relief in the action or determines that there is no just reason for delay. The juvenile court's entries adopting the magistrate's decisions were not final, appealable orders pursuant to Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(e), which provides that a court that adopts, rejects, or modifies a magistrate's decision shall also enter a judgment: the entries reviewed the magistrate's decisions, ruled on the objections and adopted the magistrate's decisions, but they did not enter judgments, and therefore, they are not final appealable orders and the appeals from the entries must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.ZayasHamilton 7/14/2017 7/14/2017 2017-Ohio-5821
State v. Pierce C-160699SPEEDY TRIAL: The trial court erred in overruling the defendant's motion to dismiss his indictment on constitutional speedy-trial grounds under the four-factor analysis set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), because all four factors weighed in favor of the defendant: first, the 13½-month delay between the defendant's indictment and arrest is presumptively prejudicial; second, the state failed to offer any evidence to explain the delay, and the state bears the burden to explain the reason for the delay under the second Barker factor; third, the defendant timely asserted his speedy-trial right by filing a motion to dismiss the indictment five days after the return of the warrant; fourth, the defendant did not have to show actual prejudice as a result of the state's delay, because prejudice was presumed under the first Barker factor, and the state offered no evidence to rebut this presumption of prejudice.DetersHamilton 7/12/2017 7/12/2017 2017-Ohio-5791
In re D.B. C-170102; C-170115; C-170151CHILDREN - CUSTODY - EVIDENCE - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS: The trial court did not err in adopting the magistrate's decision granting permanent custody of the children to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services where the decision was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Mother's due-process rights were not violated where she did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the magistrate presiding over the custody trial, because the comment made by the magistrate concerning the credibility of a witness did not constitute testimony and there was no jury that could have been prejudicially influenced by it.MillerHamilton 7/12/2017 7/12/2017 2017-Ohio-5792
Teufel v. Teufel C-160673APPELLATE REVIEW - CHILDREN - CUSTODY - SHARED PARENTING: The domestic relations court has broad discretion when determining child custody and the appellate court will not disturb the trial court's judgment if it is supported by competent, credible evidence. The domestic relations court did not abuse its discretion in ordering shared parenting where there was competent, credible evidence supporting the trial court's determination that shared parenting was in the child's best interest and the parents were able to share parenting.ZayasHamilton 7/7/2017 7/7/2017 2017-Ohio-5732
Perkins v. 122 E. 6th St., L.L.C. C-160628CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS - DRAM SHOP/R.C. 4399.18: Where there was no evidence that a liquor permit holder or an employee of the liquor permit holder had knowingly sold an alcoholic beverage to a patron who, after leaving the liquor holder's premises, drove in an intoxicated condition and caused the death of another, and where there was no evidence that, even if an alcoholic beverage had been sold to the patron, the liquor permit holder or an employee had done so with actual knowledge that the patron was noticeably intoxicated, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendant liquor permit holder on the plaintiff's wrongful-death dram-shop-liability action.MyersHamilton 6/30/2017 6/30/2017 2017-Ohio-5592
State v. Bandy C-160402AGGRAVATED MURDER - AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - SELF-DEFENSE - EVIDENCE - ALLIED OFFENSES/R.C. 2941.25 - JURY INSTRUCTIONS - COUNSEL: Defendant's aggravated-murder and aggravated-robbery convictions with firearm specifications were supported by sufficient evidence where the surviving victim of the aggravated robbery testified that the defendant and an accomplice brandishing guns approached him and his brother on a basketball court and attempted to take their jewelry, the defendant shot the brother as he was escaping over a fence, killing him, and then the defendant turned his gun on the surviving brother, who shot the defendant with the accomplice's dropped gun. The jury did not lose its way in rejecting the defendant's testimony that he had been the victim of a robbery and had only shot the deceased in self-defense while lying on the ground after being shot where the defendant's testimony was not corroborated by the evidence at trial, including bystander eyewitness testimony and the coroner's testimony concerning the path of the bullet. The trial court did not commit plain error by failing to merge aggravated-murder and aggravated-robbery offenses, because the defendant's conduct with respect to the aggravated murder demonstrated a specific intent to kill that was separate from the animus involved in the aggravated robbery of the same victim. Where the jury rejected the defendant's defense of self-defense with respect to the count of aggravated murder while committing an aggravated robbery, the defendant cannot demonstrate that the trial court's instruction that the defense of self-defense did not apply to a separate count of aggravated robbery, even if erroneous, was outcome-determinative and subject to notice under Crim.R. 52(B) despite the defendant's failure to object at trial. The defendant failed to demonstrate that any error by trial counsel in withdrawing a motion to suppress his false exculpatory statements to the police that conflicted with his trial testimony prejudiced him where the defendant testified at trial in support of his claim of self-defense and his prior inconsistent statements would have been admissible to impeach his trial testimony even if the trial court had suppressed the statements.CunninghamHamilton 6/30/2017 6/30/2017 2017-Ohio-5593
State v. Harris C-160279, C-160280, C-160281APPELLATE REVIEW/CRIMINAL - AUTOS/CRIMINAL - OVI - EVIDENCE - PROCEDURE/RULES - CRIM.R. 29(C) - INCONSISTENT VERDICTS: The sole purpose of a Crim.R. 29 motion is to test the sufficiency of the evidence and, when that evidence is insufficient, to take the case from the jury; a Crim.R. 29(C) post-verdict motion challenges defects in the sufficiency of the evidence that only become apparent after the jury returns its verdicts. The standard for reviewing a post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal made pursuant to Crim.R. 29(C) is identical to the standard for reviewing a motion for acquittal made during a trial pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A). A Crim.R. 29(C) motion is not the proper vehicle for raising errors that do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence adduced at trial. Although specificity of grounds is not required in a Crim.R. 29(C) motion, if a defendant sets forth specific grounds in his motion for judgment of acquittal, he forfeits review of all grounds not specified. Each of the four types of OVI offenses described in R.C. 4511.19(A) constitutes a separate offense. Operation of a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs, as proscribed in R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), is the basic OVI offense; a conviction under R.C. 4511.19(A)(2) also requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs but is distinguished from a violation under R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) because the state must also prove that the defendant refused to submit to a chemical test while under arrest for the current OVI violation and that he had a prior OVI conviction within 20 years of the current violation. For purposes of a conviction under R.C. 4511.19(A)(2), the refusal to take a chemical test is not itself an offense but the refusal is an element of the offense as is a prior OVI conviction within 20 years of the current violation. Seeming inconsistency between verdicts on two different charges is not a basis for reversal where the several charges are not interdependent and an inconsistency in a verdict does not arise out of inconsistent responses to different charges, but only arises out of inconsistent responses to the same charge. There is no inconsistency in jury verdicts that find a defendant not guilty under R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) yet guilty under R.C. 4511.19(A)(2) where the offenses were charged together, the evidence supported the conviction under R.C. 4511.19(A)(2), the trial court instructed the jury that the two operating-under-the-influence charges were to be decided independently and separately, and the R.C. 4511.19(A)(2) conviction was not dependent upon a finding of guilt on the other charge. The method of proving a prior conviction set forth in R.C. 2945.75(B)(1) is not the only means available to the state to carry its burden of proof; an offender's stipulation that he has committed the prior conviction satisfies the state's obligation of proof. To receive consideration on appeal, trial court errors must be raised by assignment of error and must be argued and supported by legal authority and citation to the record; where an appellant fails to take these actions, the court will dismiss the appeal.CunninghamHamilton 6/30/2017 6/30/2017 2017-Ohio-5594