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Case CaptionCase No.Topics and IssuesAuthorCitation / CountyDecidedPostedWebCite
Cincinnati v. Fourth Natl. Realty, L.L.C. C-160297CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CIVIL - MUNICIPAL - ZONING - STANDING: The trial court did not err in granting injunctive relief to the city requiring the appellant to remove a sign on its building that is in violation of the off-site sign prohibition provisions in the city's zoning code, where the appellant failed to present a prima facie case of selective enforcement and failed to show that it could keep the oversized off-site sign in place even if the appellant's free-speech-based challenges to the off-site sign provisions were successful. The trial court erred by dismissing for lack of standing the part of the appellant's counterclaim seeking a declaration that the city's off-site sign prohibition provisions are unconstitutional as applied to the appellant's desired legally-sized-off-site sign, and on their face to the extent they restrict noncommercial speech.CunninghamHamilton 4/26/2017 4/26/2017 2017-Ohio-1523
In re M.I. C-160466JUVENILE - SEX OFFENSES - EQUAL PROTECTION: The mandatory classification of 16- and 17-year-old sex offenders under R.C. 2152.83(A) and 2152.84(A)(2)(c) does not violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions, because the juvenile-sex-offender-classification system is rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest of protecting the public from sex offenders.MyersHamilton 4/26/2017 4/26/2017 2017-Ohio-1524
State v. Dardinger C-160467APPELLATE REVIEW - JURISDICTION - POSTCONVICTION - POSTRELEASE CONTROL: The common pleas court had no jurisdiction to entertain defendant's postconviction "Motion to Vacate Postrelease Control" on the grounds that he was not sentenced in conformity with the postrelease-control statutes and that imposing postrelease control denied him the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution: the motion was not reviewable under R.C. 2953.21 et seq. as a postconviction petition, because the postrelease-control claim did not allege a constitutional violation, and the alleged double-jeopardy violation did not occur during the proceedings leading to his conviction; under Crim.R. 33 as a motion for a new trial, when his conviction had followed a guilty plea, not a trial, or under Crim.R. 32.1 as a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, when the motion did not seek withdrawal of the plea; under R.C. Chapter 2731 as a petition for a writ of mandamus, under R.C. Chapter 2721 as a declaratory judgment action, or under R.C. Chapter 2725 as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, because the motion did not satisfy those statutes' procedural requirements; under Civ.R. 60(B), upon the authority of Crim.R. 57(B), because his conviction was reviewable under the procedures provided for a direct appeal; or under a court's jurisdiction to correct a void judgment, because the postrelease-control portion of his sentence was not void. The postrelease-control portion of defendant's sentence was not void, because postrelease control was properly included in his sentence: the postrelease-control notification provided by the trial court at the combined plea-and-sentencing hearing before accepting defendant's guilty plea satisfied the statutory requirement that defendant be notified concerning postrelease control at sentencing; postrelease control was properly incorporated into the judgment of conviction by the nunc pro tunc entry correcting the judgment of conviction to include postrelease control; and the double-jeopardy protection against multiple punishments was not implicated by the adult parole authority's imposition of the five-year mandatory period of postrelease control after defendant had completed his prison term and had mistakenly been told that he would not be on postrelease control, because he had no legitimate expectation in the finality of his sentence when he knew, or should have known, that his sentence was legally incomplete.Per CuriamHamilton 4/26/2017 4/26/2017 2017-Ohio-1525
State v. Ruff C-160385, C-160386SENTENCING: On appeal from a remand for resentencing on allied offenses, defendant's arguments relating to the trial court's failure to make the findings for consecutive sentences, consider the purposes and principles of sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, and notify him pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(f) that he cannot ingest or be injected with a drug of abuse and that he is required to submit to random drug testing in prison are not barred by res judicata, because they arose out of his resentencing hearing. The trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences where the trial court made the requisite findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporated those findings into the judgment entries of conviction. The trial court was not required to state on the record that it had considered the R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 factors prior to imposing sentence, and the appellate court can presume from a silent record that the trial court considered the factors prior to imposing sentence unless the defendant affirmatively shows that the court failed to do so. The court's failure to inform the defendant that he cannot ingest or be injected with a drug of abuse while in prison and that he would be required to submit to random drug testing while incarcerated did not prejudice the defendant, because R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(f) conferred no substantive rights upon the defendant, and therefore, the trial court's failure to comply with the statutory provision was harmless error. The cause must be remanded to the trial court for correction of the clerical errors in the judgment entries to reflect that the defendant had been found guilty by a jury and not the trial court.DetersHamilton 4/19/2017 4/19/2017 2017-Ohio-1430
In re M. C-170008CHILDREN - CUSTODY: The juvenile court did not err in awarding permanent custody of a child to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services where the record showed that the child's mother failed to consistently visit the child and continued to have issues with impulse control and substance abuse despite treatment, and where the child had special needs and needed permanence to address her issues, and there were no other relatives who could care for the child. The juvenile court did not err in finding that it was in the best interests of two of mother's other children to grant legal custody to the individuals who were caring for them where the record showed that mother was not in a position to care for the children and they were thriving in their placements.DetersHamilton 4/19/2017 4/19/2017 2017-Ohio-1431
In re W.M. C-170003CHILDREN - CUSTODY: Where the magistrate's finding that mother had failed to remedy the conditions that had led to the removal of her children from her home was supported by competent and credible evidence, the trial court did not err in adopting the magistrate's decision granting permanent custody of the children to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services. Although the reasonable-efforts requirement in R.C. 2151.419 does not apply to an R.C. 2151.413 motion for permanent custody, absent a narrowly defined statutory exception, the state must still make reasonable efforts to reunite the family during the custody proceedings prior to the termination of parental rights.MyersHamilton 4/14/2017 4/14/2017 2017-Ohio-1398
State v. McLendon C-160267APPELLATE REVIEW/CRIMINAL - FINAL ORDERS - JURISDICTION: A judgment of conviction is a final appealable order when it sets forth (1) the fact of conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the judge's signature, and (4) the entry on the journal by the clerk of courts. Where the judgment of conviction does not contain the fact of conviction, it is not a final appealable order, and the appeal from that judgment must be dismissed.ZayasHamilton 4/14/2017 4/14/2017 2017-Ohio-1399
State v. Carter C-150625COUNSEL - PROSECUTOR - JURY VERDICTS: Because the prosecutor's comments during closing argument were a fair commentary on the evidence presented, did not denigrate defense counsel, and were not improper, the defendant failed to establish that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument. Because defense counsel's comments during closing argument were accurate statements based on the evidence presented, constituted an acceptable trial strategy, and did not result in prejudice to the defendant, defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance. The jury did not return inconsistent verdicts by finding the defendant guilty of one charge and being unable to reach a verdict on the remaining charges.MyersHamilton 3/31/2017 4/10/2017 2017-Ohio-1328
State v. Johnson C-160242SENTENCING: While there is no constitutional right to appellate review of a criminal sentence, R.C. 2953.08 confers statutory rights upon a defendant to appeal from some felony sentences including those that are contrary to law under R.C. 2953.08(A); but R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) bars such an appeal when the sentence to be reviewed was imposed for the crime of aggravated murder. Since R.C. 2953.08 specifically and comprehensively defines the parameters of felony-sentencing appellate review, a sentence imposed for aggravated murder is not subject to review by an appellate court pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(D)(3). While an appellate court may not review the actual sentence imposed for aggravated murder, nothing in R.C. 2953.08(D) precludes review of whether the trial court complied with the requirements of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) when ordering that sentence to be served consecutively. The determination of whether a trial court properly imposed nonmandatory consecutive sentences is governed by the same statute, R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), both for general felonies and for aggravated murder; if a trial court exercises its discretion to impose consecutive sentences, it must make the consecutive-sentences findings set out in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), and those findings must be made at the sentencing hearing and incorporated into the sentencing entry.CunninghamHamilton 3/29/2017 3/29/2017 2017-Ohio-1148
Tibbe v. Ranbaxy, Inc. C-160472SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PREEMPTION - DRUG WARNING LABELS: Summary judgment was properly granted to defendant generic-drug manufacturer on federal preemption grounds on plaintiffs' state-law tort claims where the generic manufacturer presented unrebutted evidence that its product labeling was the same as the brand-name counterpart, as required by federal law, and the plaintiffs' claims that the generic-drug manufacturer was required by state law to include different or additional language in its labeling to adequately warn consumers of the risks associated with the product conflicted with the generic-drug manufacturer's federal-law duty to maintain the same labeling as its brand-name counterpart, making it impossible to comply with both laws. Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 131 S.Ct. 2567, 180 L.Ed.2d 580 (2011), followed. Summary judgment was properly granted on plaintiffs' claim that defendant generic-drug manufacturer had a state-law duty to warn consumers regarding their potential legal rights, because their claim was not supported by Ohio law.CunninghamHamilton 3/29/2017 3/29/2017 2017-Ohio-1149
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